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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
r TAH LIQrOR CONTROL CoMMIS-
SIOX, 
Libelant and Appellant, 
YS. 
JA~IES )L-tXDELES, )IRS. JAMES 
)I Ax n E L E s, ''JIM's PLACE'', 
•' )IERRY MooN INN'', and one 
20 foot bar, one 20 foot back 
bar, and others, etc .. 
Libelees and Appellees. 
N·o. 6227 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
That on June 11, 19·39, at Magna, Utah, defendants 
were operating a place where one of the businesses was 
the ·Sale of intoxicating liquor in violation of Chapter 43, 
Laws of Utah, 1935, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of 
Utah, 1937. It was a common nuisance, as defined by 
Section 195 .o.f said Law, existing at said place. On the 
11th day of June, 1939, drinks of whiskey had been sold 
to Eugene Oaks and Ralph Reid and James Mandeles 
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had been arrested and charged with n1aintaining a com-
mon nuisance and affiant had thereupon taken into his 
possession certain personal property found upon said 
preinises. A return was made to the Court ,of the Third 
Judicial District for Salt Lake County as provided by 
Section 165 alleging these facts (Ab. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13; 
Tr. 3, 4, 5, 6). The Court thereupon issued a Warrant 
of Attachment directing said E. \Y. Stringfellow, In-
spector of the Utah Liquor Control Commission, to· hold 
said property to be dealt with according to law (Ab. 14; 
Tr. 8). On the same day a Libel of Information ~was 
filed by Plaintiff, alleging that said E. \V. Stringfellow 
had seized the property described in his Return and 
further alleging that sales of intoxicating liquor had been 
n1ade upon the premises in question on May 14, 1939; 
June 4, 1939; June 10, 1939 and June 11, 1939, and 
that during said time defendants had maintained a com-
mon nuisance on the premise's in question in that they 
sold intoxicating liquor on said premises and allowed 
persons to resort to said premises £or the purpose of 
drinking alcoholic liquors in violation of Chapter 43, 
Laws of Utah 1935, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of 
Utah, 1937. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that a time 
and place for trial be fixed; that notice be given to inter-
ested persons, and upon the hearing that the property 
be condemned and sold as provided by law (Ab. 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7; Tr. 1, 2, 2lj2 ). The Court thereupon entered an 
Order fixing June 30, 1939 at 2 P. M. at which time any 
interested parties might show cause as to why the seized 
personal property, or any part thereof, should not be 
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forfeited and sold as provided by law (Ab. 13, 14; Tr. 7). 
Xotiet>s of this faet were duly served upon defendants 
and copy was .posted in defendants' premises in :Magna, 
Ftah. where said property had been seized (Ab. 17, 18, 
19, ~0. ~1; Tr. 10, 11, 12). Upon motion of counsel con-
tinuances were made until the 18th day of July, 1939. 
In the meantime clain1s had been filed by James Giolas, 
wherein he claimed certain of the property seized was 
mortgaged by defendants to him as security for a loan 
of $500.00, and said Giolas at the hearing was made 
a party defendant (Ab. 31, 32, 33; Tr. 25, 26). A Claim 
had also been filed by Alvin P. Holt, doing business as 
Consolidated Amusements, claiming he was the owner of 
certain property located in the premises, being coin 
operated machines, and accordingly Alvin P. Holt was 
made a party defendant (Ab. 33, 34, 35, 36; Tr. 27, 28). 
Claim also was filed by Ira Bosen to a coin operated 
cigarette vending machine and at the trial Ira Bosen was 
made a party defendant (Ab. 38, 39; Tr. 32, 33). Upon 
the issues so raised evidence was introduced at the hear-
ing, before Honorable Allen G. Thurman, on J u1y 18, 
1939. Counsel stated at this hearing that the only ques-
tion in dispute was as to what property was used in 
eonnection with the operation of the business conducted 
upon the premises where the personal property was 
seized. It was conceded that there was no question but 
what a violation of the Liquor Act had occurred upon 
the premises and that at least some of the property was 
subject to confiscati,on. After the Court had taken the 
matter under advisement, the decision in the case of 
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Utah Liquor Control Comrnfi,ssion vs. Wooras, -----~~-
Utah ............ , was handed down and attorneys for claim-
ants asked the privilege of reopening ·the case for the 
purpose of having evidence introduced on the question 
as to whether a violation of the Liquor Control Act 
had occurred in the presence of Inspector E. W. String-
fellow as required by Section 165 of the Liquor Control 
Act (Ab. 41, 42, 43; Tr. 36, 37). The case accordingly 
was re·opened and additional testimony was introduced 
on September 6, 1939. The Court thereafter having 
ruled that E. W. Stringfellow did not witness or have 
any personal knowledge of the sale of any intoxicating 
liquor on the premises where said articles were seized 
or any personal knowledge of any violaHon of Chapter 
43, Laws of Utah, 1935, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws 
of Utah, 1937 (Ab. 51; Tr. 45), ordered the Libel of 
Information dismissed and the property returned to 
James Mandeles and Mrs. James Mandeles (A b. 52; 
Tr. 56). 
:B..,or the purpose of presenting to this H·onorable 
Court all of the facts, a written Stipulation of the mat-
ters agreed to by counsel in open court before the Hon-
orable Allen G. Thurman, was reduced to writing and 
appears as a Stipulation (Ah. 60; Tr. 90). 
The evidence as shown by the testimony introduced 
on July 18, 1939 and September 6, 1939 and the written 
Stipulation presents the following: 
E. W. Stringfellow, an Inspector for the Utah Liquor 
Contr.ol Gommissvon had known James Mandeles for 
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approximately two years, that during that time Mandeles 
had run a place of business at .i\Iagna, Utah, kno·wn of as 
Jim's Place, being a beer parlor on the main floor and a 
dance hall and serving bar in the basement, and that the 
building occupied the southeast corner of an inter:Section 
in Magna, Utah, (.AJb. 57; Tr. 71, 72). That Exhibit A 
was a fair drawing of the main floor of the premises 
(Ab. 57). That on the 11th of June, 1939, with In-
spectors Ooulam, Jaynes and Mayhue and buyers Ralph 
Reid and Eugene Oaks, who at the time were employees 
of the Utah Liquor Control Commission, they went to 
defendants' place of business (Ah. 57; Tr. 75). That on 
numerous occasions in the preceding 6 months said 
Stringfellow had wo·rked the buyers at Mandeles' place 
of business. About 5 P. M. on June 11th the Inspectors 
and the buyers met at a point in Magna, near Mandeles' 
place wili.ere they !Conferred (Ab. 58; Tr. 67). Thereafter 
the buyers went to Mandeles' place of business. There 
was an arrangement between the buyers and the In-
spectors that if the buyers were able to buy whiskey 
they were to give the Inspectors a signal. Shortly there-
after the buyers came out and again conferred with 
Inspectors (Ab. 58; Tr. 77). The buyers again returned 
to Mandeles' place of business, the Inspectors remaining 
outside. The Inspectors received the agreed signal and 
Stringfellow and Mayhue entered the front door while 
Jaynes and Coulam entered the side door on the west of 
the building (Ab. 58; Tr. 79). When Stringfellow en-
tered the fr·ont door he walked down along by the booths 
and saw Coulam pick a glass of whiskey ·off the table 
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where buyers Reid and Oaks were sitting. Inspector 
Stringfellow testified he ·could see Reid sitting in the 
booth and could see Oaks' arm and could see Inspector 
Coulam standing in front of them and that defendant 
James Mandeles was standing nearby at a point marked 
3 on Exhibit A (Ab. 59; Tr. 80). He saw Coulam pick 
up a glass o.f whiskey from the table where Reid and 
Oaks were sitting, identified it as a whiskey glass con-
taining a dark liquid. Stringfellow then walked back 
to the south end of the bar and defendant James 
Mandeles followed him with 2 glasses in his hand. When 
Mandeles went to rinse the glag,ses out Stringfellow 
took them and there was a dark stain in them, he smelled 
them and they smelled like whiskey (Ab. 59; Tr. 82). 
Inspector Stringfellow also testified that he was in 
charge of all the Inspectors and buyers at that time and 
he had been directed by the Plaintiff to· see if intoxicating 
liquors were being illegally sold by defendants at their 
place of business and if so to obtain evidence there. An 
arrangement had been made with the buyers before they 
entered the premises, that if they were able to buy 
whiskey one was to leave and come out in the .street, 
another arrangement had been made with the Inspectors 
that if they found whiskey in any of the glasses upon 
entering the premises a nod of the head would indicate 
this fact to Inspector Stringfellow. Search of the prem-
ises disclosed a pint of Crab Orchard whiskey, from 
which the seal had not been broken, in a locked drawer 
in the bar. That thereafter Inspector Stringfellow seized 
the tangible personal property in the premises. 
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In addition to the things seen by Inspector String-
fell{)·W on June 11th hereinafter narrated he knew that 
on May 14, 1939, Eugene Oaks and Ralph Reid, as 
buyers for the Utah Liquor Control Commission and 
under the supervision of said Stringfellow, had gone to 
defendants premises in Thiagna at 5 P. M. in company 
with another person named Bill Martin and that at that 
time defendant Mandeles had sold them three drinks of 
whiskey f.or which Oaks had paid 75c and that Ralph Reid 
had then purchased three drinks of whiskey for 75c 
(Ab. 61, 63; Tr. 90, 91, 92), and also that on June 4, 1939 
at about 7:10 P. M. buyers Oaks and Reid, employees 
of the plaintiff, bought from Mandeles three drinks of 
whiskey and again at 7:35 P. M. bought three more 
drinks of whiskey and that during said time they saw 
Mandeles sell two other people in the premises drinks 
of whiskey, and that ~on June 10, 1939 at about 1:30 A.M. 
Mandeles gave Reid and Oaks each a drink of whiskey 
and at about 3 :35 A. M. that morning Reid bought from 
:Nfandeles three drinks of whiskey for 75c (A b. 62, 64; 
Tr. 92, 93). 
A. H. Jaynes and Virgil Coulam were, at the time 
of the raid on Jim's Place, Inspectors of the Utah Liquor 
Control Commissi,on and they were at the hooth where 
Reid and Oaks were sitting with drinks in front of them 
and knew it was whiskey and so informed Inspector 
Stringfellow by a nod of the head (Ab. 65, 66; Tr. 94). 
Buyers Reid and Oaks testified that they purchased two 
drinks of whiskey from Mandeles on the evening of June 
11th and that one ,of the drinks of whiskey was on the 
' 
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table at the time the Inspectors entered the premises 
and that the drink seized by Inspector Coulam, as seen 
by Inspector Stringfellow, had been purchased by the 
buyers from Mandeles. 
QUESTION TO BE DETERMINED. 
The one question for determination in this matter 
is whether or not the evidence affirmatively shows that 
"a violation of any pr·ovision (Liquor Act) occurred 
in the presence of (E. W. Stringfellow)". If, as a 
matter of fact, there was no violation in the presence of 
E. W. Stringfellow within the meaning of Section 165 
then there was no legal ground for the forfeiture of the 
property in question. If, on the other hand, there was 
a violation of the Act in the presence of E. W. String-
fellow then the case should be reversed and the Court 
directed to enter an order o.f confiscation. 
ARGUMENT. 
This same question was before this Court last year 
in the case of 
Utah Liquor Control Commission vs. W ooras, 
____ Utah ____ , 93 Pac. (2d) 455, 
where the Court construed the pertinent provisions of 
Section 165 of the Liquor Control Act of Utah in the 
£ollowing language : 
Is the seizure justified under the provisions of 
Section 165 of the Liquor Control Act, as amend-
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bon proYides that: """"hen a violation of any 
p~ovisi~n of this act shall occur in the presence 
of any wspcctor * * * it shall be the duty of 
such officer without warrant (of arrest) to arrest 
the offender * * * and if such arresting of-
ficer (the one in whose presence the o·ffense was 
committed) has reason to believe that one of the 
bu-sinesses conducted in the premises where the 
violation occurred was in violation of any of the 
provisions ·of this act he shall seize all tangible 
personal property. * * *" (Italics added). 
Under this section the seizure without a warrant 
n1ay only be made by or under the immediate 
direction and control of an officer who could at 
that time and without a warrant lawfully have 
made an arrest. That is, the officer must be one 
(a) who personally witnessed a violation of the 
Act upon the premises; and (b) who has reason 
t~n believe that ·one of the busine,g.ses conducted in 
the premises is in violation of some pr·ovision of 
the Act. An officer without such two qualifica-
tions cannot make a lawful seizure without a war-
rant. The violation, of which complaint is made 
in this action, is expres.sly ·Stated by the statute 
to constitute a misdemeanor. Here a warrant 
of arrest had not been issued and the liquor 
violation upon which libelant based its claim for 
forfeiture of the property occurred at least an 
hour or an hour and a half before the arrest was 
made and had not been committed in the presence 
of the inspector who- made the arrest nor was the 
inspector in whose presence the offense was com-
mitted even present in the building when the 
arrest was made. The meaning of ''acts com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting officer" is 
not elastic but as a general proposition is limited 
to acts that are c:;ommitted within the arresting 
officer's knowledge of them, such knowledge being 
obtained through his sight, hearing, or other 
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senses, or by the offender's admission of the facts 
made before his arrest. In Ingle v. Common-
wealth, 204 Ky. 518, 264 S. W. 1088, 1090, the 
court said: ''We have held in a number .of cases, 
and it appears to be the law everywhere, that an 
offense, in order to be committed in the presence 
of the officer, need not occur immediately within 
his vision, but that if he receives the informa-
tion of the commission of the ·o-ffense through any 
of his .senses, the most frequent of which is that 
of hearing uncommon and suspicious noises which 
he can readily locate, he is authorized to follo-w 
it up, and if it turns out that the offense was 
actually committed, it will be considered as hav-
ing been committed in his presence for the pur-
pose of authorizing him to arrest the offender 
without a warrant although the crime was only 
a misdemeanor; and if the arrest is then and there 
made (but not later), it will be a valid one, and 
followed by all of the consequences of such an 
arrest. That being true, and there is no doubt 
·concerning it since we would incorporate a long 
list ·of cases to that effect were it necessary, the 
officer would necessarily have the right, in determ-
ining whether or not an offense was being com-
mitted in his presence, to act upon ail the facts 
and appearances then and there before him 
whether they in the aggregate were obtained by 
sight, by hearing, by smelling, or by any other 
of his dependable five senses.'' (Italics added.) 
The same test as to the validity of an arrest by 
an ·officer without a. warrant is applied in Camp-
hell v. Ga-m., 203 Ky. 151, 261 S. W. 1107. Simi-
larly, in Elrod v. Moss, 4 Oir., 278 F. 123, the 
Court said that both under state and federal 
statutes authorizing arrests without warrants, to 
justify arrests made in such a manner, the officer 
must have direct personal knowledge, through his 
hearing, sight, .or other .sense of the commission 
·of the crime by the accused. Allen v. State, 183 
Wis. 323, 329, 19'7 N. W. 808, 39 A. L. R. 782; 
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State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W; 789; Peru 
v. United States, 8 Cir., 4 F. (2d) 881; State v. 
Luth, 85 W. Va. 330, 101 S. E. 434. Neither the 
arrest nor the seizure were made by nor even in 
the presence of an officer in whose presence an 
offense had been committed. 
This case and the language above set forth was before 
Judge T'hurman at the time he decided this case now on 
appeal and the Findings and Decree indicate that tha 
Judge believed that under the -opini1on in the W ooras case 
that it was necessary in order to find that a sale of intoxi-
cating liquor, in violation Qf the Utah Liquor Control A,ct, 
had occurred in the presence of an Inspector, that the 
Inspector s~hould witness all of the details of the .sale, 
which would include the placing of the order by the 
buyers, the acceptance of the order by the ·seller, the de-
livery by the seller and the payment by the buyer. It is 
conceded in this case that the Inspecto·r did not see the 
order pla:ced nor tihe acceptance of the order by the seller, 
nor did he see the delivery of the whiskey, nor did he 
see it paid for. However, he did see the whiskey in the 
possession .of the buyer immediately after delivery and 
he did ·see the defendant, Mandeles, returning with two 
whiskey glas·ses to the bar, and they contained the very 
definite odor of whiskey. And there is the additional 
fact that there wa.s no other liquor upon the premises, 
other than the liquor in the possession ·o.f Mandeles, and 
there were only two' other customers in the place at the 
time. The Court's attention is respectfully called to Sec-
tion 181 of the Liquor Cont:vol Act as follows: 
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''In any proceeding brought for the purpose of 
enfinrcing any provision of this act in proving the 
sale, disposal, gift or pur0hase, gratuitous or 
otherwi,se, or consumption ·of alcoholic beverages, 
it .shall not be necHssary to show that any money 
actually passed or alcoholic beverage was actually 
consumed if the judge hearing the case is sa tis-
fled that a transaction in the nature of a sale, dis-
posal, gift ·Or purch~se actually took place, or that 
any consumption of alcoholic beverage was about 
to take place; and proof of consumption or in-
tended consumption of alcoholic beverage on 
premises on which .such Cionsumption is probihited, 
by some person not authorized to consume a.l-
coholi!c beverages thereon, shall be evidence that 
such alcoholic beverage wa's sold or given t~o· or 
pur-chased by the pe\rson consuming, or being 
about to consume, or carrying awa:y the same as 
against the ·Occupant of the said premises.'' 
It is the contenti,o:n of Appellant that an offense 
has been committed in the presence of an arresting of-
ficer within the meaning of Section 165, when the officer 
ma.y, under all the circumstances and from the exercise 
of his own senses together with ,o,ther information from 
sources ·so reliable that a practical and careful person, 
having due regard for the rights of others, would act 
thereon have rea·sonable and probable cause to believe 
that a violati,orn of the Liquor Act had been committed 
and there was no opportunity provided for the officer to 
obtain a warrant for the ·Search and seizure. This rule 
is thus stated in the case of 
United States vs. Hilsinger, (1922; D. C.) 
284 Fed. 585. 
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Before continuing to explore ~other cases along the 
same line, we wish to take this opportunity of pointing 
out the nature of the Liquor Control Act, because the 
nature of the A!c.t and its practical application is material 
to the construction of the verbage appearing therein. 
Section 164, which is the section governing seare~hes 
made pursuant to search and seizure warrants provides 
that warrants may issue when ''alcoholic beverages are 
possessed, manufactured, s·old, bartered, given away * 
* * in violation'' of the act and a seizure may ~only he 
made "on finding alcoholic 1bevera.ges in unlawful pos-
session or use". In .other words, by virtue ·Of the fa~ct 
that intoxicating liquors may be lawfully owned it is no1 
sufficient to justify seizure to merely find intoxicating 
liquors, in addition thereto it must be found that they are 
being unlawfully used, whi0h for all practi1cal purposes 
means they are being offered for sale, or sold. This re-
duces itself to proof of sale. In -other words, it has been 
generally -considered that under Section 164 that you 
must not only prove sales ,of intoxicating liquor but that 
upon a search you must find the .stock of liquor from 
which sales are being made. 
Section 165 requires that an offense be "committed 
in the presence .of an Inspector.'' An Inspector is a 
peace ,officer and they are charged with the duty of en-
forcing the law. An Inspector is not an informant, an 
under·cover man, or a stool pigeon. A violation of the 
Liquor Control Act is a premeditated ,offens·e undertaken 
for profit, and the perpetrator of the offense undertakes 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
to prote-ct himself insofar as possible from detection and 
his first step is to make him·self familiar with the of-
ficers of the Utah I~iquor Oontrol Commission. Beooming 
practical again, it can be truly said that if the Inspectors 
of the Utah Liquor Control Commission are to be, and 
remain, law enforcement ·officers in contrast with under-
cover agents, buyers and ·stool pigeons that it will be 
impossible for them to1 be pre·sent and see all of the ele-
ments constituting the sale of intoxicating liquors. The 
nature of their particular task requires the employment 
of undercover agent·s as buyers f~om time to .time, who 
can, without di.sd~osing their employment, enter premises 
where one of the businesses is the unlawful sale of in-
toxicating liquors and may there purchase intoxieating 
liquors, then notify the Inspector under whom they work. 
This having been done it is the contention 1of Appellant 
that for the purpose of .Section 165 the information of 
the undercover agents employed by, and working, for the 
Inspector as well as the knowledge of the other Inspe-c-
tor·s working on a particular case should be construed 
together and if, as is pointed out in cases hereinafter 
cited, a violation of the law actually occurred and the 
Inspector was relyin·g upon information whic;h. a reason-
able and practical person would consider reliable then 
the seizure· will be lawful. 
In reviewing the authorities, and there is a host of 
authorities eons truing the words ''violation in the pre-
sence of" it must be borne in mind that practically all 
of the cas·es are those under Prohibition Acts where pos-
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13 
session of intoxicating liquor was the gravaman of the 
offense so that a finding of the .offending fluid and a. de-
termination of possession concluded the offense, whereas 
aibove indicated the elements necessary to prove the sale 
under the act involves much more. 
In interpreting the pertinent part of Section 165 it 
hardly seems necessary to go through any exhaustive 
analysis of the authorities, but we will cite thereafter a 
few cases which mig·ht be helpful. In 
Harry Miles v. State of Oklahoma, 
236 P. 57, 44 A. L. R. 129. 
Miles was ·c.onvicted of unlawful possession of intoxicat-
ing liquor. The evidence showed that Wiggins had been 
a guest at the Ketchum Hotel f.or two or three days and 
during this time had remained in his room iu an intoxi-
cated condition and that Miles had been observed coming 
to and from \Viggins' room. The manager ;of the hotel 
had .asked the Sheriff to send a deputy to the hotel, 
which was done, and the manager pointed Miles out to 
the deputy, who saw a bottle in the left hand coat pocket 
of Miles. The deputy arrested Miles and sear0hed him, 
found four bottles of whiskey on his pers-on. Miles con-
tended that the ·searcli and seizure was in violation of his 
constitutional rights and not admissible in evidence. In 
sustaining the conviction the oourt said : 
"We are clearly of the opinion that, upon the 
undisputed facts in this case, the officer was au-
thorized to arrest the defendant, because his 
conduct in the presence of the officer oonstituted 
a breach of the peace. '' 
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It will be not~d in this case .tha..t the deputy before ar-
resting Miles did not know that the bottle he saw in Miles' 
coat pocket contained whiskey. The fact that it did con-
tain whiskey and that the pos.session of whiskey con-
stituted an .offense justified the arre-st without a warrant 
and made the search and seizure lawful. In other words, 
Stringfellow in seeing the V{thiskey on the table in front 
of the buyers didn't know then, so far as information 
coming to his sight or hearing was concerned, that a sale 
had been made, but the testimony of the buyers proved 
the missing facts and justified the arrest without the war-
rant and the seizure of t1he property in question. The 
authors of American Jurisprudence state the rule in the 
following language: 
4 Am. Jur. 22. 
"Wha.t a:m.ownts to committing offense in officer's 
presence. An offense is considered as taking 
place within the view of an officer where his 
senses afford him knowledge that one is being 
committed. Hence, if it is committed in his hear-
ing and so near that he cannot be mistaken as to 
the offender, this is sufficient. Accordingly, an 
assault is considered as being committed in the 
presence of the officer if he is near enough to hear 
the outcries and arrives immediately after the 
disturbance has been completed, or if, while out-
side a house, he hears dis·orderly conduct within. 
Where a breach of the peace is committed in the 
presence of an officer, it is immaterial that he 
could not, at the time, on account of darkness, 
actually see the offenders. Under the statutes 
relating to intoxicating liquor, the offense is 
regarded as committed in his presence when it is 
committed with his knowle-dge, whether through 
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' 'sight, hearing, or other sen~es, or by the, off~nd~ 
er 's admission of the fact before· arrest. But it 
seems that the mere. transportation of concealed 
liquor or the carrying of. concealed. weapons with-: 
out ·other circumstances or conditions is not the 
·commission of an offense in the officer's presence 
so as to authorize an arrest without a warrant.''· 
The '":est Virginia Court in 
lVest Yirginia v. Koil, 
103 W. V a. 19, 136 S. ·E. 510, 
holds that a ·Crime is. committed in the presence of au of~ 
ficer when the facts and circumstances oocurring ·within 
his IQibservation, in connection with what, under the cir-
cumstances, may be considered as common knowledge, 
give him pr-obable cause to believe or reasonable grounds 
to suspect tha.t such is. the case. 
The Montana rule as set forth in 
State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court (1924) 
70 Mont. 378, 225 Pac. 1000, 
to the effoot that the facts and circumstances must he 
sufficient to justify the conclusi1on of the officer that 
there is probable cause that an offense is. being c;om-
mitted in his presence, and in.this connection "probable 
cause" wa1s defined as "the knowledge of facts, actual or 
apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in 
the belief that he has lawful griQunds for arresting the 
defendant and is,suing a eomplaint. '' 
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The Court recognized the problem of enforcing the 
liquor laws of the State of North Carolina, which in 
many respects is .similar to the case at bar. In the 
case of 
State v. Campbell, (1921) 
182 N. C. 911, 110 S. E. 86, 
the Court said: 
"In the case at bar the officers had information 
which proved to be correct, and the defendant was 
carrying on his person, concealed, a quantity of 
liquor in violation of the provisions of the Consol. 
Stat. above quoted. The offense was eontinuing, 
and the sale had not been consummated at the 
time the arrest was made. In many cases, unless 
an arrest is made under these circumstances, the 
criminal would escape or the crime be committed 
before the officer could make affidavit and obtain 
a warrant. For instance, if the officers had in-
formation, which was reliable, that one was carry-
ing a eoncealed weapon, or was on his way to 
commit an assault with it, surely it would be their 
duty to arrest the offender, though our statute 
and our decisions require that in such case they 
should at once take him before a judicial officer 
and procure a warrant and institute a judicial 
investigation." 
Appellant recognizes that an officer has no right 
to make an arrest on suspicion, neither has an ,officer 
the right to search and seize under Section 165 on mere 
suspicion, but where the premises have been ''cased'' 
as in the ca.se at bar, by having buyers working under 
an Inspector over a period of time and the buyers hav-
ing made numerous purchases of intoxicating liquor on 
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the premises, in Yiola tion of the law, and where the 
buyers entered the premises under agreement to notify 
the Inspectors "·hen the sale is made and a number of 
Inspectors entered the premises simultaneously for the 
purpose of blocking exits and forestalling concealment 
of evidenee or destruction thereof, then we contend that 
if the e,·idence actually proves the sale of intoxicating 
liquor in violation of the law and that one of the bus-
inesses conducted upon the premises was the business of 
selling intoxicating liquor in violation of the Liquor 
Control Act, that then the search and seizure was lawful 
and the property used in connection with. the business 
is contraband and should be destroyed as provided in 
Section 168 of the Liquor Control Act. 
It is respectfully submitted that the case should be 
reversed with instructions to the trial Court to enter 
Findings and Decree that a violation of the act ~occurred 
in the presence of Inspector Stringfellow and that the 




D. HOvVE 1\IOFFAT, 
GEORGE H. LUNT, 
Attorneys for Libelant 
and Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
